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Abstract	  The	   violence	   that	   erupted	   in	   Medellín	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   provoked	   a	   number	   of	  responses	  from	  the	  state	  and	  numerous	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  The	  1990s	  saw	  a	   boom	   in	   civil	   society	   activism	   and	   municipal	   initiatives	   in	   response	   to	   this	  violence.	   Another	   response	   concerned	   punitive	   ‘securitisation’:	   the	   police	   and	  army	   -­‐	  often	   in	   collusion	  with	  paramilitary	  groups	   -­‐	  were	  deployed	   to	  pacify	   the	  most	   violent	   precincts	   of	   the	   city.	   These	   ‘securitisation’	   processes	   have	   been	  counterproductive,	   compounding	   criminal	   structures	   and	   chronic	   violence	   in	  Medellín.	  In	  this	  context	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  municipal	  youth	  policies	  have	  struggled	  to	  reduce	  youth	  violence	  or	  challenge	  the	  power	  of	  gangs	   in	   poor	   neighbourhoods,	   hence	   the	   title	   of	   this	   chapter	  Swimming	  Against	  
the	  Tide.	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Introduction	  
	  Medellín	   has	   been	   affected	   by	   urban	   violence	   since	   the	   1950s,	   the	   rise	   of	  which	  was	   captured	   by	   the	  working	   class	   poet	   Helí	   Ramirez	   Gómez	   in	   the	   1970s	  who	  spoke	  of	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  galladas	  [gangs]	  of	  poor	  young	  men	  ‘many	  of	  whom	  were	  capable	  of	  killing’	  (1979:	  10).	  Violence	  intensified	  dramatically	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  onwards,	   the	   majority	   of	   which	   occurred	   in	   the	   city’s	   poor	   neighbourhoods,	   or	  
comunas	   populares	   (Medina	   Franco,	   2006).	   By	   1991,	   Medellín	   had	   achieved	   the	  undistinguished	  record	  of	   the	  highest	  per	   capita	  homicide	   rate	   in	  history,	   at	  381	  per	  100,000	  inhabitants	  (Suárez	  Rodriguez,	  2005:	  203)1.	  This	  violence	  was	  linked	  to	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   broader	   armed	   conflict	   in	   Colombia,	   brought	   about	   by	   a	  cocktail	  of	  gangs,	  youth	  assassins	  –	  sicarios	  –,	  drug	  cartel	  violence,	  urban	  militias	  linked	  to	  left-­‐wing	  guerrillas	  groups,	  paramilitary	  and	  state	  violence.	  	  The	  violence	  in	  Medellín	  has	  provoked	  a	  number	  of	  responses	  from	  the	  state	  and	  numerous	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   Despite	   significant	   levels	   of	   civil	   society	  activism	  in	  Medellín,	  few	  scholars	  however	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  progress	  made	  by	  such	  activism,	  or	  upon	  non-­‐violent	  youths	  more	  generally.	  Rather	  -­‐	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  violentologia	  tradition	  –	  they	  have	  focused	  instead	  upon	  belligerent	  groups	  (for	  example	   Amnesty	   International,	   September	   2005;	   Hylton,	   2007;	   Rozema,	   2008;	  Bedoya,	   2010).	   Such	   analyses	   frequently	   cite	   the	   repressive	   acts	   of	   the	   state,	  criticising	   ‘traditional	  politics’	   and	   the	   role	   that	  neoliberal	  expansionism	  plays	   in	  exacerbating	  inequalities,	  whilst	  highlighting	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  paramilitary	  demobilisation	   process	   in	  Medellin	  which	   began	   in	   2004.	   Such	   analyses	   help	   us	  unpack	   the	   dynamics	   of	   violence	   in	   Medellín	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   abuses	  committed	   under	   the	   state’s	   securitisation	   doctrine,	   but	   little	   is	   said	   of	   the	  progress	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  state-­‐led	  municipal	  youth	  work,	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	  working	  with	  youth	  in	  a	  context	  of	  ‘chronic	  violence’2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  a	  city	  of	  1.6	  million	  in	  1991,	  a	  staggering	  total	  of	  6,349	  homicides	  were	  recorded	  that	  year,	  and	  in	   total	  between	  1986	  and	  1993	   there	  were	  33,546	  homicides	   (Marquéz	  Valderrama	  and	  Ospina,	  1999:	   14).	   For	   comparative	   purposes,	   Perlman	   refers	   to	   Rio	   de	   Janerio	   being	   one	   of	   the	   most	  violent	  cities	  in	  the	  world	  in	  2004.	  The	  homicide	  rate	  then	  was	  37.7	  per	  100,000	  (Perlman,	  2008:	  52),	  a	   tenth	  of	   the	  homicide	  rate	   in	  Medellín	   in	  1991.	   In	  2008	   the	  rate	   in	  Medellín	   then	  began	   to	  climb	  again	  to	  45.6.	  	  2	  ‘Chronic	  violence’	  is	  a	  concept	  put	  forward	  by	  Jenny	  Pearce	  (2006)	  where	  violence	  is	  understood	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First,	  this	  chapter	  charts	  the	  lesser-­‐told	  stories	  concerning	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  last	   two	   decades	   of	   civil	   society	   activism	   and	   the	   work	   of	   the	  Mayor’s	   Office	   in	  youth	  work	   and	   violence	   intervention.	   Given	   the	   vast	   number	   of	   initiatives	   that	  have	   taken	   place,	   this	   account	   is	   indicative	   rather	   than	   exhaustive.	   A	   number	   of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  have	  written	  about	  their	  youth	  work	  experiences,	  often	  published	  as	   reports	   through	   the	   local	   organisation	   that	   frequently	  do	  not	   reach	  broader	   academic	   audiences3.	   Relatively	   little	   has	   been	   systematised	   about	   the	  development	   of	   youth	   work	   across	   Medellín,	   or	   the	   influence	   that	   civil	   society	  organisations	   have	   had	   in	   the	   development	   of	   municipal	   youth	   policy;	   nor	   has	  there	   been	   any	   significant	   evaluation	   of	   how	   such	   work	   has	   prevented	   youth’s	  engagement	  with	  violence	  and	  armed	  groups,	  although	  one	  recent	  exception	  is	  the	  
Observatory	   for	   Human	   Security	   in	   Medellín	   (see	  http://www.repensandolaseguridad.org)4.	  Given	  the	  lacunae	  in	  the	  literature,	  this	  chapter	   has	   been	   complimented	   by	   a	   number	   of	   interviews	   conducted	   between	  2006-­‐8	   and	   2011-­‐13	  with	   the	   pioneers	   of	   youth	  work	   in	  Medellín,	   to	   be	   able	   to	  effectively	   chart	   its	   development	   and	   limitations	   in	   the	   face	   of	   on-­‐going	   urban	  violence.	  	  Second,	   this	   chapter	   argues	   that	   from	   2004,	   sectors	   of	   the	   Colombian	   state	  apparatus	   responded	   with	   dramatic,	   often	   ‘spectacular’	   violence	   (also	   see	  Goldstein,	  2004),	  such	  has	  the	  ‘Orion	  Operation’	  helicopter	  gun-­‐ship	  attack	  on	  the	  
Comuna	   13	   neighbourhood	   in	   October	   2002.	   The	   police	   and	   army	   frequently	  combined	  with	  paramilitary	  groups	  in	  the	  most	  violent	  precincts	  of	  the	  city,	  rolling	  out	   previously	   rural	   counter-­‐insurgency	   strategies	   into	   Medellín’s	   poor	  neighbourhoods.	  This	  process	   contributed	   to	   a	   sharp	   short-­‐term	   fall	   in	  homicide	  rates	  as	  paramilitary	  groups	  asserted	  a	  monopolistic	  control	  over	  violence	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	   some	   settings	   as	   three-­‐dimensional;	   persisting	   over	   time,	   at	   high	   intensity,	   and	   in	   a	   given	  location.	  As	  such	  is	  reflects	  the	  dynamics	  of	  gang	  violence	  in	  Medellín.	  Chronic	  violence	  as	  a	  concept	  has	  recently	  gained	  traction	  in	  policy	  circles	  (see	  Adams,	  2011).	  3	  For	  example	  Corporación	  Picacho	  Con	  Futuro	   (Jiménez	  Caballero,	  2006),	   the	   Instituto	  Popular	  de	  
Capacitación	  (Uran	  Arenas	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Ruiz	  Botero	  and	  Hernández	  Martínez,	  2008)	  or	  Corporación	  
Región	   (Andrade,	   1992;	   Pérez	   and	   Peláez,	   1990;	  Marquéz	   Valderrama	   and	  Ospina,	   1999;	   Orozco	  and	  Morales,	  1990;	  Salazar,	  1990;	  Jaramillo	  Echeverri,	  1990).	  4	  In	  general	  across	  Latin	  America	  and	  Caribbean	  there	  has	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  violence	   prevention	   work,	   although	   in	   recent	   years	   data	   collection	   and	   analysis	   has	   been	  improving.	  See	  (Baird,	  2013b;	  Muggah	  &	  Aguirre,	  2013;	  Muggah,	  2012).	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urban	  periphery5.	  However,	   these	  groups	  were	   intertwined	  with	  drug	   trafficking	  and	   organised	   crime	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   criminal	   violence	   quickly	   usurped	   any	  political	   motivations	   the	   paramilitaries	   may	   have	   had,	   thereby	   embedding	   the	  prospects	  for	  long-­‐term	  urban	  insecurity.	  	  	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  both	  civil	  society	  youth	  work	  and	  municipal	  policy	  to	  reduce	  crime	  and	  violence	  amongst	  the	  demographic	  between	  15-­‐24	  years	  of	  age	  has	  been	  hampered	  by	  these	  processes.	  Youth	  work	  and	  youth	  policies	  are	  swimming	  against	   the	  tide	  of	  violence	  and	  criminal	  opportunities	   for	  Medellín’s	  poor	  youth	  -­‐	  hence	  the	  title	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Whilst	  youth	  work	  should	  be	  applauded	   for	   providing	   positive	   opportunities	   for	   a	   number	   of	   young	  people,	   it	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  power	  of	  gangs	  and	  organised	  crime	  nor	  break	  the	   cycles	  of	   youth-­‐led	  urban	  violence	   that	   still	   dominate	   the	  comunas	  populares	  today.	  	  	  
The	  development	  of	  youth	  work	  in	  Medellin	  since	  1990	  
	  
Civil	  society	  organisations	  Although	  many	  non-­‐governmental,	  church,	  community,	  academic,	  trade	  union	  and	  other	   civil	   society	   organisations	   (collectively	   here	   CSOs)	   had	   been	  working	  with	  youth	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  chronic	  levels	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  provoked	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  CSO	  activity	  in	  response	  to	  the	  ‘new	  world	  of	  youth	  driven	  social	   violence’	   (Marquéz	  Valderrama	   and	  Ospina,	   1999:	   35;	   Interview,	  Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	  Crucially,	  this	  response	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  opening	  up	  the	  state	  to	  change,	  allowing	  civil	  society	  activists	  to	  drive	  youth	  policy	  development.	  Medellín’s	   violence	   uncovered	   the	   total	   absence	   of	   state	   policy	   towards	   youth	  (Interview,	  Cruz,	  20/11/2007;	  Urán	  Arenas,	  2000:	  46);	  ironically	  the	  violence	  that	  blighted	  the	  poor	  also	  put	  them	  on	  the	  policy	  map.	  Where	  the	  1980s	  in	  Colombia	  was	  know	  as	   the	   ‘lost	  decade’	   in	   terms	  of	  worsening	   living	   conditions	  of	   youths,	  Medellín	   during	   the	   1990s	   became	   the	   equivalent	   of	   a	   ‘gold-­‐rush’	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Much	  has	  been	  debated	  about	  gangs	  as	  ‘parallel’	  powers	  or	  ‘perverse’	  powers	  in	  contexts	  of	  urban	  violence	  in	  Latin	  America.	  See	  Rodgers	  &	  Baird	  (2015).	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development	   of	   youth	   policy	   from	   state	   and	   civil	   society	   sectors,	   including	   of	  course	   the	   academy,	   international	   aid	   agencies,	   and	   even	   multilateral	  organisations.	  The	  development	  of	  youth	  work	   in	  Medellín	  contrasted	  with	  other	  cities	  in	  the	  country;	  whilst	  youth	  policies	  in	  the	  1990s	  weakened	  in	  general	  across	  the	  country,	  in	  Medellín	  they	  became	  stronger.	  	  The	  initial	  responses	  from	  CSOs	  were	  assistance	  programs	  to	  intervene	  and	  treat	  violent	   groups	   by	   targeting	   ‘problem’	   youth	   –	   principally	   gang	   members	   and	  militias6	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   conflict	   (Angarita	   Caña,	   2000:	   37;	   Arias,	  20/11/2007;	   Marquéz	   Valderrama,	   21/07/2006).	   CSO	   interventions	   with	   gang	  members	   and	   militias	   were	   problematic	   processes.	   Church	   groups	   in	   particular	  together	  with	   some	   CSOs,	   initiated	   pacts	   of	   non-­‐aggression	   between	   rival	   gangs	  and	  militias	   from	  1990-­‐1994.	   Although	   these	  met	  with	   some	  punctual	   successes	  their	   overall	   impact	   was	   quickly	   lost	   beneath	   the	   swell	   of	   violence	   (Interviews,	  Marquez	   Valderama,	   21/07/2006;	   Mosquera,	   10/10/2007).	   Fulbia	   Marquéz	  Valderrama	  from	  NGO	  Corporación	  Región	  has	  worked	  with	  youth	  and	  violence	  in	  Medellín	   since	   the	   1980s,	   including	   several	   demobilisation	   attempts	   with	   gang	  members.	   She	   argued	   that	   removing	   the	   ‘logic	   of	   conflict’	   from	   a	   drug	   addicted	  young	   man	   who	   has	   killed	   several	   people,	   whilst	   violence	   continues	   to	   rage	   all	  around	   him	   is	   an	   extremely	   difficult	   task	   (Interview,	   Marquéz	   Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	  Marquéz	  recalled	  her	  mediation	  and	  reintegration	  experiences	  with	  gang	  members	  and	  militias	  between	  1990	  and	  1994:	  
“We	   put	   in	   a	   tremendous	   amount	   of	   effort…	   but	   there	   were	   old	   vendettas	  
between	  the	  youths	  and	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  to	  resolve	  their	  issues	  whilst	  they	  
were	   still	   killing	   each	   other.	   If	   they	   didn’t	   kill	   each	   other	   then	   the	   police	  
would,	  saying	  ‘if	  you	  do	  the	  crime,	  you	  do	  the	  time’.	  Even	  if	  a	  youth	  had	  gone	  
through	  the	  whole	  [reintegration]	  process	  to	  get	  out	  [of	  the	  gang]	  they	  killed	  
him	  anyway.	  It	  was	  a	  tough	  period	  and	  we	  had	  to	  relocate	  lots	  of	  kids	  because	  
they	   were	   killing	   them.	   If	   they	   went	   back	   the	   militias	   would	   kill	   them,	   or	  
another	   gang	   or	   the	   police…	   very	   few	   survived”	   (Interview,	   Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	  	  Such	  problems	  were	  common.	  NGO	  Popular	  Institute	  for	  Education	  or	  IPC,	  worked	  with	   the	   state	   on	   negotiation	   processes	   with	   left-­‐wing	   urban	   militias	   but	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   Militias	   were	   young	   men	   recruited	   by	   left-­‐wing	   guerrillas	   from	   the	   broader	   armed	   conflict	  including	   the	   FARC,	   ELN	   and	  M-­‐19,	   to	   ‘defend’	   communities	   from	   gangs.	   This	   brought	   them	   into	  conflict	  with	  gangs	  and	  also	  state	  security	  forces.	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militias	   ended	   up	   being	   sucked	   back	   into	   the	   conflict	   (Interview,	   Arias,	  20/11/2007).	  Moments	   after	   a	   landmark	   agreement	   had	   been	   reached	   between	  gangs	  and	  militias	  at	  the	  Media	  Luna	  ceasefire	  process	  mediated	  by	  the	  church	  in	  September	  1994,	  fighting	  erupted	  outside	  the	  negotiation	  room	  and	  several	  youths	  were	  killed	  (Interview,	  Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	  	  Given	  the	  resource	  intensive	  needs	  and	  limited	  successes	  of	  these	  initiatives,	  many	  CSOs	   began	   to	   look	   for	   new	   approaches	   to	   youth	   work	   (Interview,	   Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	  Despite	  the	  stigmatisation	  of	  youth,	  particularly	  males	  from	   the	   comunas	   populares,	   progressive	   CSOs	   recognised	   that	   most	   of	   these	  youths	  were	  in	  fact	  not	  violent.	  Of	  some	  509,000	  youth	  in	  the	  city	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  14-­‐26	  years	  old,	  only	  8-­‐12,000	  had	  been	  directly	  involved	  in	  violence	  (Marquéz	  Valderrama,	   Field	   Diary,	   12/09/2007).	   Such	   organisations	   began	   to	   shift	   their	  focus	  towards	  youths	  that	   lived	  in	  contexts	  of	  violence	  and	  poverty	  that	  could	  be	  classified	  as	  ‘at	  risk’	  of	  joining	  armed	  groups	  -­‐	  youths	  living	  in	  socio-­‐economically	  deprived	  contexts	  with	  abundant	  gang	  activity.	  Youth	  work	  began	  to	  shift	  towards	  the	   realm	   of	   prevention,	   focusing	   on	   youth	   development,	   livelihoods,	   training,	  education,	  cultural	  activities	  and	   the	   like.	  Some	  of	   these	  programs	  were	  oriented	  specifically	   to	   prevent	   youths	   from	   joining	   armed	   groups,	   such	   as	   campaigns	  against	   violence,	   whilst	   other	   approaches	   were	   indirect,	   focusing	   on	   providing	  alternative	  opportunities	  and	  livelihoods	  for	  youths	  so	  they	  would	  not	  opt	  to	  join	  violent	  groups.	  	  Many	   CSOs	   had	   long	   been	   concerned	   with	   the	   political	   and	   social	   formation	   of	  youth,	   particularly	   those	   with	   left-­‐wing	   ideologies,	   aiming	   to	   turn	   youths	   from	  poor	   parts	   of	   town	   into	   critical	   citizens	   that	   reclaimed	   their	   rights	   (Interview,	  Arias,	   20/11/2007).	   Crucially,	   such	   organisations	   were	   beginning	   to	   equate	  youths’	  quality	  of	  life	  with	  access	  to	  opportunities	  and	  livelihood	  choices	  as	  part	  of	  an	   emancipatory	   approach	   to	   prevent	   violence	   (Interview,	   Arias,	   20/11/2007).	  Youth	  were	  to	  be	  ‘empowered’	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  projects	  and	  made	  visible	  as	  positive,	  not	  dangerous	  or	  delinquent,	  individuals:	  
“This	   was	   one	   of	   the	   focuses	   that	   we	   pursued…	   participation,	   because	  we	  
said	   that	   one	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   things	   that	   [youth]	   need	   is	  
recognition	  and	  to	  be	  made	  visible	  in	  public,	  not	  as	  violent	  but	  as	  productive	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individuals	   that	   support	   the	   development	   of	   the	   city…	   participating…	  
constructing	  new	  knowledge”	  (Interview,	  Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006)	  	  Academic	   studies	   of	   violence	   rose	   rapidly	   in	   Medellín	   throughout	   the	   1990s	  (Jaramillo	  Giraldo	  and	  Buritica	  Londoño,	  2000	  ),	  and	  youth	  work	  from	  community	  organisations,	  NGOs,	  international	  aid	  agencies	  and	  even	  multilateral	  development	  banks	   expanded.	   In	   1998	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Development	   Bank	   funded	   the	  ‘Program	   for	   Citizenship’	   to	   prevent	   youth	   violence,	   together	   with	   the	   Mayor’s	  Office	   (Interview,	   Ruiz	   Botero,	   03/10/2007).	   Analysis	   of	   violence	   became	   more	  sophisticated.	   In	   a	   review	   of	   Colombian	   literature	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   Angarrrita	  Caña	   observed	   that	   Medellín’s	   violence	   emerged	   due	   to	   multi-­‐social	   causes,	  namely;	  marginalisation,	  poverty,	  unemployment,	  family	  breakdown	  and	  domestic	  violence,	   poor	   socialization	   of	   values,	   and	   poor	   education	   (Angarita	   Caña,	   2000:	  46).	   Today,	   urban	   violence	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   by	   scholars	   as	   ‘multi-­‐causal’	   and	  socially	   generated.	  However,	   two	  decades	   ago	   these	   sophisticated	   analyses	  were	  already	   emerging	   in	   Medellín.	   CSOs	   began	   to	   talk	   about	   ‘prevention	   programs’	  linked	   to	  holistic	  development	  as	  early	  as	  1990	   to	  respond	   to	  violence,	  at	  a	   time	  when	   traditional	   securitisation	   approaches	   based	   on	   punitive	   crack-­‐downs	  dominated	   policy	   discourse	   (Salazar	   1990;	   Angarita	   Caña,	   2000).	   These	   were	  significant	   developments,	   considering	   that	   they	   emerged	   four	   years	   before	   the	  UNDP	  popularised	  the	  landmark	  term	  ‘human	  security’,	  marking	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  ‘security’	  (United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  1994).	  	  The	   concept	   of	   ‘youth	   violence’	   itself	   emerged	   in	   1992	  with	   a	   focus	   on	   a	   youth	  ‘subculture’	  of	  violence	  and	   ‘micro-­‐socialisation’	   (Angarita	  Caña,	  2000:	  302-­‐303).	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  there	  was	  so	  much	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘youth	  condition’	  that	  some	   said	   it	  was	   sobre-­‐diagnosticada	   –	   over-­‐diagnosed	   (de	  Dios	   Graciano,	   1995:	  420).	   Nevertheless,	   youth	   policy	   moved	   steadily	   towards	   more	   integral	   and	  innovative	  forms	  of	  development	  (Balbin	  Alvarez	  and	  Abad	  Gallardo,	  1996).	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Engaging	  the	  State	  and	  Developing	  Youth	  Policy	  A	  key	   turning	  point	   in	   civil	   society	  engagement	  with	   the	   state	  occurred	  during	  a	  seminar	   on	   youth	   and	   violence	   in	   1990,	   where	   community	   organisations	  recognised	   that	   the	   state	   had	   made	   no	   efforts	   to	   help	   the	   local	   population	  participate	  or	  organise	   itself	   (Pérez	  and	  Peláez,	  1990).	  This	  was	   the	  genesis	  of	   a	  shift	  in	  civic	  culture	  where	  communities	  began	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  diagnosis	  and	  solutions	   to	   the	   conflict	   that	   affected	   them	   (Jaramillo	   Echeverri,	   1990).	   Local	  organizations	  stated	  that	  the	  two	  principle	  problems	  that	  fuelled	  insecurity	  were	  a	  lack	  of	  local	  education	  and	  employment	  (Jaramillo	  Echeverri,	  1990:	  230-­‐231).	  This	  was	   a	   telling	   disjuncture	   from	   the	   state’s	   approach	   at	   the	   time,	   which	   was	  repressive	   policing	   while	   social	   abandonment	   continued.	   The	   local	   population	  wanted	  to	  participate	  in	  municipal	  decision-­‐making;	  they	  came	  from	  a	  part	  of	  the	  city	  that	  the	  state	  had	  never	  paid	  any	  attention	  to,	  let	  alone	  designed	  policies	  for.	  	  Certainly,	   a	  number	  of	  CSOs	  have	  generated	  significant	  positive	  developments	   in	  their	   communities,	   notably	   because	   of	   their	   resilience	   and	   perseverance	   in	  conditions	  of	  significant	  insecurity.	  For	  example,	  one	  community	  leader	  said:	  “I’m	  from	  Villa	  Guadalupe,	  the	  Paris	  of	  the	  [poor]	  north	  eastern	  precinct!	  We	  got	  this	  far	  because	   we	   fought	   tooth	   and	   nail	   for	   everything	   we	   have.	   We	   even	   took	   civil	  servants	   to	   court	   to	   get	   them	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   obligations	   (sic)”;	   another	  compared	  her	  battles	  with	  civil	  servants	  to	  obtain	  basic	  utilities,	  using	  a	  metaphor	  for	  making	  sancocho	  stew:	  “They	  won’t	  just	  provide	  you	  with	  sancocho,	  you	  have	  to	  demand	   the	  potatoes,	   then	  go	  back	  and	  demand	   the	  meat,	   then	   the	  carrots,	   then	  the	  water,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  cook	  it	  yourself	  (sic)”	  (Field	  Diary,	  05/04/2008).	  Another	  leader,	  septuagenarian	  Rosalba	  Henao,	  spoke	  animatedly	  of	  her	  success	  in	  getting	  the	  state	  to	  put	  in	  sewage	  and	  transport	  systems	  in	  her	  neighbourhood,	  albeit	  after	  a	  38	  year	  struggle	  (Field	  Diary,	  05/04/2008).	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  much	  debate	  in	  terms	  of	  impact	  assessment	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	   measuring,	   either	   qualitatively	   or	   quantitatively,	   the	   impact	   of	   civil	   society	  activity	  on	  violence	  reduction	  in	  communities,	  which	  remains	  a	  challenge	  in	  such	  analyses	  of	  Medellín.	  As	  high	   levels	  of	  violence	  and	  the	  presence	  of	   illegal	  armed	  groups	   persist	   in	   Medellín,	   further	   research	   is	   needed	   to	   understand	   the	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relationship	   between	   CSO	   strengthening	   and	   violence	   reduction	   in	   contexts	   of	  chronic	   violence	   (for	   example	   Pearce,	   2006).	   As	   this	   chapter	   later	   argues,	   the	  impact	   of	   CSOs	   on	   violence	   reduction	   has	   been	   hindered	   by	   state	   securitisation	  policies	   that	   further	   embedded	   armed	   groups	   into	   peripheral	   communities.	  However,	  despite	   these	  caveats,	  without	  CSO	   intervention	  Medellín	  would	  surely	  be	  a	  more	  violent	  city.	  	  Civil	   society	   influence,	   particularly	   from	  NGOs	   and	   academia	  has	   been	  pivotal	   in	  shaping	   municipal	   youth	   policy	   (Interview,	   Cruz,	   20/11/2007).	   Since	   the	   early	  1990s	  a	  number	  of	  CSOs	   tried	   to	   influence	   fledgling	  government	  policy	  on	  youth	  and,	   more	   broadly	   speaking,	   development,	   pushing	   for	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   most	  vulnerable	   populations	   (Balbin	   Alvarez	   and	   Abad	   Gallardo,	   1996).	   From	   earnest	  beginnings,	   by	   2004	   CSOs	   were	   co-­‐designing	   youth	   policy	   with	   the	   municipal	  administration	   (Interview,	  Marquéz	   Valderrama,	   21/07/2006).	   This	   process	   can	  be	   traced	   back	   to	   1988	   when	   the	   inter-­‐institutional	   Committee	   on	   Youth	   –	  PAISAJOVEN	  –	  was	  established,	  bringing	  together	  a	  range	  of	  CSOs	  and	  the	  business	  community	  to	  promote	  youth	  organization,	  education	  and	  vocational	  training	  and	  to	   counter	   the	   negative	   association	   of	   youth	   with	   rising	   violence	   (see	   Table	   2	  below).	   This	   in	   itself	   was	   a	   remarkable	   development	   given	   the	   mutual	   distrust	  between	   state	   institutions	   and	   CSOs,	   particularly	   given	   the	   high	   rates	   of	   human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  Medellín.	  Many	  CSO	  staff	  and	  activists,	  particularly	  those	  working	  in	   human	   rights,	   had	   been	   assassinated,	   ‘disappeared’	   or	   abducted	   by	   state	  security	   forces	   and	   allied	   paramilitary	   groups.	   In	   1999,	   for	   example,	   four	  researchers	   from	  the	  NGO	  IPC	  were	  kidnapped	  from	  their	  offices	  by	  a	  right-­‐wing	  paramilitary	  group	  (CIDH,	  1999).	  	  Significant	   in	   these	   developments	  was	   the	   new	   Colombian	   Constitution	   in	   1991,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  rights	  into	  common	  law,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  Ley	  de	  
Juventud,	  or	  Law	  on	  Youth	  in	  1996	  (Pérez,	  1996:	  22).	  “It	  now	  became	  a	  battle	  for	  rights	   based	   in	   the	   constitution…	   we	   took	   a	   few	   years	   to	   get	   round	   to	   it,	   to	  understand	   that	   we	   had	   an	   important	   tool,	   which	   from	   then	   on	   became	  fundamental	   for	  understanding	  public	  policies”	   (Interview,	  Marquéz	  Valderrama,	  21/07/2006).	   As	   Urán	   Arenas	   notes,	   the	   1990s	   marked	   “a	   certain	   coming	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together…	  of	  proposals	   around	  human	   rights	   and	  political	  participation	  between	  NGOs	  and	  the	  state”	  (Urán	  Arenas,	  2000).	  The	  development	  of	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	   youth	   work	   helped	   the	   articulation	   of	   youth	   organisations	   in	  the	  violent	  periphery:	  
“There	  was	  a	  boom	  in	  cultural	  expressions	  which	  was	  very,	  very	  significant,	  
very	   strong,	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  work,	   the	   groups,	   artistic	   expression,	   cultural	  
expression,	   youth	   groups,	   lots…	   It’s	   one	   of	   those	   paradoxical	   things	   in	  
Medellín:	   In	   the	   very	   same	   neighbourhoods	   where	   there	   is	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
social	  exclusion	  and	  marginalisation,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  all	  of	  this	  violence,	  
youths	  have	  so	  many	  initiatives”	  (Inteview,	  Ruiz	  Botero,	  03/10/2007).	  	  By	  2007	  there	  was	  vast	  range	  of	  organisations	  and	  institutions	  working	  with	  youth	  –	   see	   Table	   1	   below.	   In	   a	   generalised	   taxonomy	   here,	   these	   included;	   state	  institutions	  based	  at	  the	  municipal	  offices	  such	  as	  Metrojuventud;	  ‘corporate	  NGOs’,	  large	  and	  established	  organisations	  such	  as	  Corporación	  Región	  and	  IPC	  with	  full-­‐time	   staff,	   having	   the	   capacity	   to	   produce	   research	   and	   fund	   their	   own	   youth	  projects;	  smaller	  NGOs	  carrying	  out	  work	  directly	  with	  youths;	  networks	  for	  youth	  education	   and	   training	   such	   as	   the	  Alliance	   for	   Youth	  Mobilisation;	   locally	   based	  community	   organisations	   such	   as	   Con-­‐Vivamos;	   youth	   groups,	   organisations	   and	  networks	  such	  as	  Red	  Juvenil	  and	  Picacho	  con	  Futuro;	  political	  party	  youth	  groups	  such	  as	   Jovenes	  Fajardistas;	   industry	   funded	   ‘youth	  and	   family’	  welfare	  programs	  known	  as	  Cajas	  de	  Compensación	  Familiar;	  and	  a	  number	  of	  church	  based	  outreach	  programs	  such	  as	  Corporación	  Don	  Bosco	  or	  the	  Association	  of	  Christian	  Youth.	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Table	  1	  –	  Indicative	  Range	  of	  Organisations	  Working	  with	  Youth	  
	  
Type	  of	  Organisation	   Example	  	  Municipal	  offices	   Metrojuventud	  (formerly	  Youth	  Office)	  ‘Corporate’	  NGOs	   Established	   organisations;	   e.g.	   Corporación	  
Región	   and	   IPC,	   produce	   research	   and	  capacity	  to	  fund	  youth	  projects	  NGOs	   Work	   directly	   with	   youths;	   e.g.	   theatre	  groups,	  sports	  initiatives,	  etc	  Networks	   for	   youth	   education	   and	  training	   e.g.	  Alliance	  for	  Youth	  Mobilisation	  	  Local	  Community	  Organisations	   e.g.	  Corporación	  Con-­‐Vivamos	  Youth	   groups,	   organisations	   and	  networks	   e.g.	   Red	   Juvenil,	   Corporación	   Picacho	   con	  Futuro	  Political	  party	  youth	  groups	   e.g.	  Jovenes	  Fajardistas	  Industry	   funded	   ‘youth	   &	   family’	  welfare	   programs	   (Cajas	   de	  
Compensación	  
	  Familiar)	  	  
e.g.	   COFAMA,	   COMFENALCO	   –	   investing	   in	  health,	  education,	  recreation	  programs	  	  
Church	  based	  outreach	   e.g.	   Corporación	   Don	   Bosco,	   Association	   of	  
Christian	  Youth	  	  There	  are	  numerous	  different	  programs	  working	  with	  youth	  in	  Medellín.	  In	  2007	  
Metrojuventud	   alone	   was	   running	   ninety-­‐eight	   youth	   programs	   simultaneously	  with	  municipal	   funding	   (Interview,	   Cruz,	   20/11/2007).	   Table	   2	   below	  highlights	  the	   development	   of	   municipal	   youth	   policy.	   What	   this	   demonstrates	   is	   the	  significant,	   plural	   and	   innovative	   responses	   of	  many	   parts	   of	   society	   to	  working	  with	  vulnerable	  youth	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  violence	  of	   the	  1990s.	  These	  processes	  made	  Medellín	   stand	  out	   from	  other	   cities	   in	   the	   country,	   namely	  Bogotá,	  which	  did	   not	   achieve	   the	   same	   level	   of	   articulation	   amongst	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   social	  actors.	  	  However,	  developing	  youth	  policy	  was	  far	  from	  plain	  sailing.	  Luz	  Marina	  Cruz,	  the	  former	  director	  of	  the	  municipal	  Youth	  Office,	  and	  Edgar	  Arias	  from	  IPC	  agree	  that	  the	   struggle	   for	   civil	   society	   participation	   in	   public	   policy	   has	   been	   a	   long	   one	  (Interviews,	   Arias,	   20/11/2007;	   Cruz,	   20/11/2007).	   Arias	   noted	   the	   long	  ideological	  battle	  against	  traditional,	  top-­‐down	  and	  anti-­‐participatory	  attitudes	  in	  politics.	   There	   was	   also	   widespread	   ignorance	   amongst	   civil	   servants	   around	  youth	   issues.	  Youths	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  demographic	  group	   that	  needed	  specific	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attention	   even	   though	   they	  were	   the	   protagonists	   of	   city’s	   violence	   (Interviews,	  Guisado,	  29/11/2007;	  Cruz,	  20/11/2007).	  
	  
Table	  2	  -­‐	  A	  Chronology	  of	  Youth	  Policy	  Development	  
	  1988	   –	   Negative	   association	   of	   youth	  with	  rising	  violence	   -­‐	   Inter-­‐institutional	   Youth	   Committee	   –	  PAISAJOVEN	  established	  1991	   -­‐	   Intervention	   with	   a	   focus	   on	  assistance	  	   -­‐	   Presidential	   Envoy	   for	   ‘Youth	   &	   Family’	  Maria	  Emma	  Mejía	  sent	  to	  Medellín	  
-­‐	  Casas	  Juveniles	  -­‐	  Youth	  Houses	  established	  -­‐	  Youth	  Round	  Table	  1994	   –	   Intervention	   with	   a	   focus	   on	  participation	   -­‐	  Mayor’s	  Office	  on	  Youth	  	  -­‐	  Municipal	  Youth	  Council	  (CMJ)	  established	  1995	   -­‐	  Youth	  Clubs	  -­‐	  Youth	  Development	  Plan	   tailored	   for	  each	  city	  precinct	  	  -­‐	  Program	  ‘Life	  for	  Everybody’	  1996	   -­‐	   ‘Law	  on	  Youth’	   coded	   from	  1991	  National	  Constitution	  1998-­‐2000	  –	  Integral	  youth	  approach	   -­‐	   Program	   for	   Citizenship.	   Financed	   by	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  IDB	  and	  Mayor’s	  office	  -­‐	   Accord	   02	   in	   2000	   for	   Public	   Policy	   on	  Youth	  2002-­‐2003	   -­‐	   Creation	   of	   Sub-­‐Secretariat	  Metrojuventud	  in	  municipal	  government	  -­‐	  Youth	  Development	  Plan	   for	  Medellín	  and	  Antioquia	  region	  2004-­‐2007	  –	  Youths	  as	  protagonists	  of	  city	  transformation	   -­‐	  Increased	  youth	  participation	  -­‐	  Concretising	  of	  institutional	  youth	  policies	  
Adapted	   from	   presentation	   by	  Metrojuventud	   Director	   Luz	   Marina	   Cruz	   at	   the	   ‘Review	   of	  
Public	  Policy	  on	  Youth,	  2007’,	  Medellín	  (01/11/2007)	  	  Initiatives	  started	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  but	  by	  1994	  the	  Mayor’s	  ‘Office	  on	  Youth’	  was	  established	  with	  the	  input	  of	  NGO	  specialists,	  and	  even	  a	  demobilised	  militia	   commander	   (Interview,	   Cruz,	   20/11/2007).	   The	   coming	   together	   of	   the	  state	   and	   CSO	   elements	   is	   still	   controversial	   in	  Medellín,	   particularly	  within	   the	  NGO	   community,	   however	   this	   process	   was	   a	   departure	   from	   the	   traditional	  antagonism	  of	  the	  past.	  	  	  By	  2002,	  the	   ‘Office	  on	  Youth’	  had	  been	  upgraded	  to	   ‘Sub-­‐Secretariat’	   level	  at	  the	  Mayor’s	   Office	   and	   became	   known	   as	  Metrojuventud.	   Since	   the	   municipal	   inter-­‐institutional	   youth	   committee,	   PAISAJOVEN,	   was	   launched	   in	   1988,	   the	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development	  of	  youth	  policy	   though	   the	  1990s	   slowly	  opened	   “the	  doors	   for	   the	  application	   of	   social	   policy”	   (Jimenez,	   1996:	   52),	   laying	   the	   foundations	   for	  unprecedented	  state	  /	  civil	  society	  cooperation.	  	  Political	  and	  administrative	  tussles	  became	  easier	  over	  time	  as	  youth	  work	  within	  the	  municipal	  institutions	  became	  more	  recognised.	  Furthermore,	  it	  became	  easier	  to	   develop	   youth	   work	   under	   the	   Mayors	   Sergio	   Fajardo	   Valderrama	   (2004-­‐7),	  then	  Alonso	  Salazar	   Jaramillo	  (2008-­‐2011).	  Fajardo	  was	  the	   first	  Mayor	  who	  had	  not	  come	  from	  a	  traditional	  political	  party,	  demonstrating	  political	  innovation	  and	  a	   keenness	   to	   work	   directly	   with	   the	   city’s	   youth;	   he	   was	   succeeded	   by	   Alonso	  Salazar,	  a	  founder	  member	  of	  NGO	  Corporación	  Región.	  Only	  a	  few	  years	  earlier,	  it	  would	   have	   been	   unthinkable	   that	   someone	   from	   the	   ‘NGO	   sector’	   would	  participate	  in	  a	  Mayoral	  election	  race,	  let	  alone	  win.	  	  When	  Fajardo	  came	  into	  power	  a	  number	  of	  NGO	  members	  ‘moved	  over’	  to	  work	  directly	   in	  municipal	   offices.	   As	   part	   of	   a	   concerted	   effort	   to	  work	  more	   closely	  with	  civil	  society	  stakeholders	  in	  general,	  projects	  were	  funded	  through	  CSOs	  who	  were	   also	   integral	   to	   the	   new	   municipal	   Participatory	   Budget	   implementation.	  Whilst,	  of	  course,	  interaction	  between	  the	  municipal	  offices	  which	  work	  on	  youth,	  and	   civil	   society	   stakeholders	   is	   far	   from	   perfect,	   this	   reflected	   a	   generalised	  ‘opening	  up’	  of	   the	  state	   to	  civil	   society	  participation,	  beyond	  youth	  policy	  alone.	  Nowadays,	   staff	  mobility	   between	   CSO	   and	  municipal	   offices	   is	   vastly	   increased.	  For	   example,	   Yesid	   Henao,	   the	   former	   sub-­‐secretary	   of	   Metrojuventud	   (2011)	  began	  at	  community	  youth	  organisation	  Corporación	  Picacho	  con	  Futuro.	  	  Since	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Office	   on	   Youth	   in	   1994,	   the	   municipal	  administration	   has	   undoubtedly	   come	   a	   long	   way.	   The	   development	   of	   youth	  policy	  demonstrates	  one	  face	  of	  the	  state’s	  response	  to	  violence.	  Whilst	  there	  are	  of	  course	   caveats	   and	   limitations,	   the	   progress	   and	   achievements	   of	   CSO	   working	  with	  the	  youth	  population	  are	  notable.	  This	  process	  is	  on-­‐going	  as	  Guisado,	  one	  of	  the	   founders	   of	  municipal	   youth	  work	   through	   PAISAJOVEN	   reflected:	   “We	   have	  made	  significant	  progress	  in	  Medellín	  in	  last	  15	  years,	  but	  there	  is	  still	  a	  long	  way	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to	   go”	   (Interview,	   Guisado,	   29/11/2007).	   Therefore	   it	   is	   important	   to	   critically	  evaluate	  this	  progress.	  	  	  
Evaluating	  the	  impact	  of	  youth	  work	  in	  contexts	  of	  chronic	  urban	  violence	  
	  Certainly	   these	   initiatives	  have	  generated	  many	  positive	  opportunities	   for	   young	  people	  in	  Medellín	  (Baird,	  2013a).	  However,	  methodologically	  it	  is	  complicated	  to	  quantify	  how	  this	  may	  have	  reduced	  levels	  of	  gang	  membership	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  city7.	  Lamentably,	  youth	  policy	  and	  youth	  work	  initiatives	  have	  been	  hampered	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  provide	  livelihood	  options	  for	  youths	  and	  to	  dissuade	  them	  from	  engaging	  with	  gang	  life.	  Here	  there	  are	  three	  principle	  challenges:	  First,	  many	  CSOs	  are	  under-­‐resourced	  and	  struggle	  for	  survival,	  and	  despite	  the	  rise	  to	  prominence	  of	   youth	  policy	  within	  municipal	   institutions,	   it	   is	   still	   a	   challenge	   to	  have	   youth	  projects	  prioritised	  and	  integrate	  their	  approaches	  with	  other	  government	  offices	  –	   such	   as	   health,	   education	   and	   particularly	   policing	   and	   traditional	   security	  provision	  (Cruz,	  20/11/2007).	  Second,	  a	  number	  of	  community	  organisations	  have	  noted	  what	  they	  call	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  ‘integral	  state	  policy’	  to	  target	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  violence	  such	  as	  exclusion,	  inequality	  and	  poverty,	  arguing	  that	  previous	  programs	  such	  as	  Fuerza	   Joven,	   ‘Youth	  Strength’,	   only	  provide	   temporary	   respite	  where	  structural	  causes	  of	  violence	  are	  not	   tackled	  more	  effectively,	  and	  as	  such	  fail	  to	  interrupt	  the	  “vicious	  cycle	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  poorest	  neighbourhoods”	  (Con-­‐Vivamos,	   12/08/2010:	   5).	   Contexts	   of	   exclusion	   have	   been	   extensively	   linked	   to	  gang,	  youth	  and	  urban	  violence	  in	  the	  literature	  (e.g.	  Rodgers	  &	  Baird,	  forthcoming	  2015;	  Winton,	  2004;	  Moser	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005;	  Barker,	  2005;	  Koonings	  and	  Kruijt,	  2007;	  Koonings	  and	  Kruijt,	  2009;	  Gutiérrez	  Sanín,	  2009;	  Barker,	  2005).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  youth	  gangs	   -­‐	  paradigmatic	  of	   such	  violence	   -­‐	  are	  actually	  dystopian	  epiphenomena	   of	   broader	   structural	   systems	   of	   exclusion	   embedded	   in	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  city.	  Third,	  the	  continuing	  background	  of	  chronic	  violence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Measuring	   a	  negative	  phenomenon	   –	   violence	  not	   occurring	   –	   is	   difficult,	   particularly	   given	   the	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  contribute	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  to	  homicide	  rates	  dropping,	  such	  as;	  the	  domination	  of	  one	  criminal	  syndicate	  over	  the	  city,	  rising	  youth	  employment	  rates,	  rising	  levels	  of	   youths	   in	   full	   time	   education,	   improved	   policing,	   reduction	   in	   small	   arms	   and	   light	   weapons	  availability,	  demobilisation	  processes,	  et	  cetera.	  See	  also	  Baird,	  2013b.	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in	   Medellín	   has	   impeded	   the	   success	   of	   youth	   work	   and	   youth	   policies.	   This	   is	  complex	  and	  requires	  further	  explanation.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   the	   state	   ‘securitisation’	   response	   to	   urban	   violence	   has	   been	  counterproductive	   by	   actually	   fortifying	   organised	   crime	   with	   linkages	   to	   gang	  activity.	  When	  youth	  work	  was	  developing	  in	  Medellín	  and	  high	  rates	  of	  homicide	  persisted	  amongst	  the	  youth	  population,	  the	  state’s	  securitisation	  response	  to	  gang	  and	  insurgent	  violence8	  involved	  police	  and	  military	  crack-­‐downs	  of	  the	  mano	  dura	  ilk,	  but	  with	  a	  Colombian	  twist	  -­‐	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Medellín	  this	  involved	  collusion	  with	  paramilitary	   groups	   (Civico,	   2012;	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   2001;	   Llorente,	   2009;	  Noche	  &	  Niebla,	   2002;	   Rozema,	   2008).	   Paramilitary	   groups	   ‘took	   over’	  Medellín,	  coercing	  gangs	  and	  putting	  them	  on	  the	  payroll.	  One	  gang	  member	  was	  asked	  why	  he	  joined	  the	  paramilitaries,	  he	  replied	  matter-­‐of-­‐factly:	  
For	  security.	  Because	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  where	  we	  lived	  there	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  
wars…	  You	  have	  to	  go	  with	  the	  flow	  of	  your	  neighbourhood.	  How	  could	  we	  be	  
against	  the	  neighbourhood?	  You	  had	  to	  join	  the	  paramilitaries	  when	  they	  took	  
over	  (Carritas,	  16/07/2008)	  	  The	  alternatives	  to	  joining	  the	  paramilitaries	  for	  young	  gang	  members	  were	  to	  flee	  or	  be	  killed.	  Unsurprisingly	  most	  gang	  members	  joined	  up	  and	  inter-­‐gang	  turf	  wars	  subsided	   temporarily	   leading	   to	   a	   drop-­‐off	   in	   the	   homicide	   rate	   –	  Medellín’s	   so-­‐called	   ‘miracle’9.	   The	   takeover	   of	   Medellín	   was	   led	   by	   the	   paramilitary	   group	  
Bloque	  Cacique	  Nutibarra,	  headed	  by	  the	  crime-­‐lord	  Diego	  Murillo	  a.k.a.	  Don	  Berna,	  which	   quickly	   absorbed	   rival	   paramilitary	   group	   Bloque	   Metro10.	   The	   supposed	  paramilitary	   takeover	   in	   the	  mid-­‐2000s	   is	  actually	  a	  misnomer	   for	  what	  was	   the	  reconfiguration,	   and	   then	   assertion,	   of	  Don	   Berna’s	   criminal	   control	   of	   the	   city’s	  narcotics	   dominated	   underworld.	   Such	   was	   his	   control	   that	   the	   term	   Don	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Left-­‐wing	  urban	  militia	  groups	  linked	  to	  the	  broader	  armed	  conflict.	  9	  For	  debate	  see	  for	  example	  http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/17/medellin-­‐murder-­‐capital-­‐to-­‐model-­‐city-­‐miracle-­‐un-­‐world-­‐urban-­‐forum	  (cited	  04/10/2014).	  10	  As	  stated	  by	  InSight:	  “After	  Operation	  Orion,	  paramilitary	  group	  Bloque	  Metro	  was	  absorbed	  by	  the	   Medellin	   crimelord	   Murillo	   and	   his	   paramilitary	   wing,	   Bloque	   Cacique	   Nutibara.	   Murillo's	  control	   was	   total,	   even	   during	   a	   peace	   process	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   paramilitary	  groups.	   In	  2003,	   for	   instance,	   in	   order	   to	   keep	  up	   the	   appearance	   that	  Murillo	  was	   collaborating	  with	  authorities	  during	  that	  process,	  he	  ordered	  the	  combos	  to	  keep	  murder	  rates	  low.	  The	  peace	  lasted	   until	   Murillo	   himself	   was	   extradited	   in	   2008,	   and	   Vargas	   and	   Bonilla	   began	   battling	   for	  control	   of	   the	   city.”	   Cited	   in	   http://insightcrime.org/investigations/insight-­‐exclusives/item/906-­‐medellins-­‐turbulent-­‐comuna-­‐13	  (21/10/2011).	  A	  conflict	  broke	  out	  for	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  city	  between	  the	  Bloque	  Metro	  and	  the	  Bloque	  Cacique	  
Nutibarra,	  as	  portrayed	  in	  the	  comuna	  8	  in	  Scott	  Dalton’s	  documentary	  La	  Sierra	  (2005).	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Bernabilidad	  emerged	  in	  the	  local	  slang,	  or	  parlache,	  as	  a	  play	  on	  words	  mixing	  his	  name	  with	  the	  Spanish	  word	  for	  governance	  (Llorente,	  2009).	  Although	  the	  Bloque	  
Cacique	  Nutibarra	  espoused	  political	  rhetoric	   in	  reality	  their	  political	  pretentions	  were	   nil;	   they	   acted	   as	   the	   preceding	   organised	   criminal	   syndicates	   or	   oficinas	  before	   them,	   using	   local	   gang	   members	   as	   foot-­‐soldiers	   to	   control	   the	   city’s	  lucrative	   retail	   drugs	   sales	   market.	   These	   ‘grey’	   alliances	   between	   gangs	   and	  paramilitaries	  were	  fomented	  by	  state-­‐led	  securitisation,	  leading	  gangs	  to	  become	  evermore	   ‘structure	   like’11	   and	   embedded	   in	   communities.	   This	   increased	   their	  capacity	  to	  recruit	  vulnerable	  male	  youths	  into	  their	  ranks,	  strengthening	  the	  logic	  of	   criminal	   violence	   and	   continued	   insecurity	   in	   Medellín’s	   peripheral	   comunas	  
populares.	  	  
Don	  Bernabilidad	  was	  essentially	  the	  exertion	  of	  a	  criminal	  logic	  of	  violence	  over	  a	  political	   one.	   This	   logic	   of	   violence	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   using	   a	   typology	   of	  armed	   violence	   fatalities:	   those	   which	   occur	   in	   ‘conflict’	   -­‐	   political,	   guerrilla-­‐paramilitary-­‐state	   –	   versus	   those	   which	   are	   ‘non-­‐conflict’	   -­‐	   criminal,	   social,	  economic,	  institutional	  (Moser	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005;	  Small	  Arms	  Survey,	  2013)12.	  As	  noted	  by	  Daniel	  Peacut	  as	   far	  back	  as	  1997,	  85%	  of	  Colombia’s	   lethal	  violence	   is	  not	  accounted	  for	  by	  combat	  deaths	  directly	  attributed	  to	  the	  armed	  conflict,	  but	  by	   criminal	   and	   social	   ‘disorganised’	   violence	   (Pecaut).	   This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  dominance	  of	  organised	  crime	  and	  gangs	   in	  Medellín	   today.	  For	  example,	   for	   the	  research	   conducted	   for	   this	   chapter	   40	   life-­‐history	   interviews	   were	   conducted	  with	   youths	   who	   sometimes	   called	   themselves	   gang	   members,	   and	   sometimes	  paramilitaries.	  However,	  not	  a	  single	  one	  claimed	  that	  they	  joined	  an	  armed	  group	  for	  political	  purposes.	  One	  example	  of	  this	   is	  Carritas	  who	  refers	  to	  his	  economic	  rational	  for	  joining	  the	  gang:	  “It’s	  Don	  Berna	  that	  ran	  everything,	  so	  the	  high	  command	  had	  to	  pay	  attention	  
to	  what	  he	  said	  because	  he	  was	  the	  one	  who	  controlled	  the	  money…	  So	  like	  I’m	  
telling	  you,	  the	  boss	  in	  the	  one	  with	  the	  money.	  If	  you’ve	  got	  a	  boss	  who	  can’t	  
buy	  you	  a	  drink,	  who	  can’t	  hand	  you	  a	  bit	  of	  money,	  phssssh	  [whistles	  out	  air],	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	   For	   further	   debate	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   gang	   or	   local	   armed	   group	   as	   a	   structured	   and	  structuring	  entity	   that	  generates	  violence	  see	  Baird	  (Chapter	  3,	  2011).	  Pearce	  has	  referred	  to	   the	  intergenerational	  transmission	  of	  violence	  (Pearce,	  2006),	  and	  Scheper-­‐Hughes	  &	  Bourgois	  (2004:	  1)	   comment	   that	   ‘reproduced’	   violence	   is	   increasingly	   referred	   to	  with	   a	   range	   of	   terms	   such	   as	  cyclical,	  mimetic,	  spirals,	  mirrors,	  et	  cetera.	  12	   On	   definitions	   of	   ‘conflict’	   and	   ‘non-­‐conflict’	   violence	   see	   Small	   Arms	   Survey,	   2013.	   For	   a	  typeology	  of	  violence	  see	  Moser	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005.	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what	   sort	   of	   boss	   is	   that?	   That’s	   no	   kind	   of	   boss!	   (Interview,	   Carritas,	  16/07/2008).	  
	  In	  Medellín’s	  comunas	  populares	  where	  gangs	  are	  ubiquitous,	  the	   ‘relative	  riches’	  of	   gang	  membership	   (Pitts,	   2008)	   are	   particularly	   seductive	   in	   a	   context	   where	  alternative	   and	   dignified	   livelihood	   opportunities	   are	   stymied.	   From	   a	   gendered	  perspective	  gangs	  provide	  young	  men	  with	  an	  attractive	  pathway	  to	  manhood	   in	  emasculating	  settings	  (Baird,	  2012b,	  2015;	  Barker,	  2005).	  This	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  local	  male	  youths	  need	  join	  the	  gang	  –	  as	  low	  as	  5%	  -­‐	  to	  perpetuate	  its	  structure	  and	  to	  maintain	  high	  levels	  of	  violence	  and	  fear	  (Baird,	   2012b).	  Under	   these	   conditions,	   preventing	   youths	   joining	   gangs	   and	   the	  subsequent	  perpetuation	  of	  their	  structures	  is	  extremely	  challenging.	  	  The	  above	  analysis	  helps	  explain	  why	  youth	  work	  and	  youth	  policies	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  undermine	  or	  fundamentally	  subvert	  the	  control	  of	  local	  gangs	  in	  Medellín.	  Municipal	   offices	  of	   the	   state	   and	   civil	   society	  organisations	  have	  made	  progress	  with	  youths	  living	  in	  poor	  neighbourhoods	  by	  providing	  a	  range	  of	  alternatives	  to	  violence,	   but	   they	   have	   not	   been	   able	   to	   ‘disembed’	   and	   uproot	   gang	   structures	  from	   local	   communities.	   Gang	   dominance	  was	   starkly	   apparent	   in	   2013	  when	   a	  women’s	  rights	  activist	  and	  respected	  community	  leader	  from	  the	  notorious	  north-­‐east	  corner	  of	  the	  city	  explained	  that,	  despite	  years	  of	  personal	  recognition	  for	  her	  work,	   she	   still	   had	   to	   pay	   extortion	   fees	   or	   vacunas	   to	   the	   local	   gang.	  When	   she	  confronted	   the	   local	   gang	   leader,	   bravely	   or	   naively,	   he	   promptly	   threatened	   to	  murder	   her	   family	   if	   she	   refused	   to	   pay	   (field	   diary,	   27/07/2013).	   This	   reflects	  similar	  experiences	  of	  youth	  work	  by	  NGOs	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  as	  Gay	  says,	  “few	  of	  them	   challenged	   the	   power	   of	   gangs,	   however,	   or	   could	   be	   considered	  transformative	   in	   the	   broader	   political	   sense	   of	   the	   word”	   (Gay,	   2009).	   It	   is,	  understandably,	  very	  difficult	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  oppose	  gang	  rule	  in	  such	   settings.	   This	   means	   the	   broader	   challenges	   of	   working	   in	   gang-­‐controlled	  neighbourhoods	  remain.	  Keeping	  youths	  out	  of	  crime	  and	  violence	  when	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  negotiate	  the	  gangs	  in	  their	  daily	  lives	  is	  a	  hard	  task	  indeed.	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Conclusions	  
	  There	   have	   been	   many	   successes	   of	   civil	   society	   activism	   in	   promoting	   human	  security,	  development,	  political	  participation,	  and	  bringing	  about	  social	  change	  in	  Medellín.	   They	   have	   also	   played	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   bringing	   to	   power	   and	  influencing	  the	  policies	  of	  recent	  Mayors	  Sergio	  Fajardo	  (2004-­‐7),	  Alonso	  Salazar	  (2008-­‐11)	  and	  Aníbal	  Gaviria	  (20012-­‐15).	  We	  need	  to	  flag	  up	  these	  successes,	  and	  in	  many	  ways,	  Medellín	   is	   a	   laboratory	   for	   civic	   responses	   to	   human	   insecurity,	  reflected	   by	   the	  Observatory	   for	   Human	   Security	   in	  Medellín,	   as	  much	   as	   it	   is	   an	  epicentre	  of	  urban	  violence.	  Medellín’s	   civil	   society	   is	  undoubtedly	  a	  vibrant	  and	  wealthy	   source	   to	   learn	   from	   and	   co-­‐construct	   knowledge	   around	   violence	  reduction.	  However,	  civic	  efforts	  including	  municipal	  work	  by	  youth	  offices	  such	  as	  
Metrojuventud	   in	   violence	   prevention	   have	   been	   undermined	   by	   the	   state	  securitisation	   policies	   of	   the	   2000s,	   which	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   on-­‐going	  criminal	  domination	  of	  the	  city.	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  say	  that	  youth	  work	  has	  failed	  to	  ‘disembed’	  the	  power	  of	  gangs	  in	  Medellín’s	  most	  vulnerable	  communities	  when	  state	   security	   forces	   have	   been	   complicit	   in	   promoting	   paramilitary	   groups	   that	  have	   added	   momentum	   to	   organised	   criminal	   violence	   and	   drug	   trafficking,	  leading	  to	  the	  strengthening	  of	  gang	  structures.	  This	  promotes	  the	  gang’s	  capacity	  to	  self-­‐perpetuate	  through	  the	  continued	  recruitment	  of	  poor	  young	  men	  into	  their	  ranks,	   driving	   Medellín’s	   chronic	   violence.	   State	   policies	   in	   this	   sense	   are	   Janus	  faced:	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   ‘securitisation’	   has	   compounded	   the	   criminal	   structures	  and	  gangs	   that	  draw	  youths	   into	   lives	  of	  violence;	  whilst	  on	   the	  other,	  municipal	  offices	   like	   Metrojuventud	   actively	   run	   programs	   to	   give	   youths	   positive	  alternatives	  to	  joining	  the	  gang.	  If	  youth	  policies	  are	  to	  reduce	  violence	  and	  if	  civil	  society	   organisations	   are	   to	   be	   more	   effective,	   integrated	   strategies	   are	   needed	  that	  combine	  their	  efforts	  with	  the	  legitimate	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  comunas	  populares.	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